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HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY: 
EXPRESSIVE HARM AND THE 
STAKES OF “MARRIAGE” 
CORINNE BLALOCK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After years of political struggle, same-sex marriage advocates 
initially celebrated when the Court granted a writ of certiorari in not 
one but two cases related to same-sex marriage this term: United 
States v. Windsor1 and Hollingsworth v. Perry.2 It was all but a foregone 
conclusion that the United States Supreme Court would review the 
Defense of Marriage Act; the grant in Perry, however, took many by 
surprise.3 Realization that the two cases cut against one another on 
important issues tempered the initial excitement.4 Following oral 
arguments, many began to speculate that the grant of certiorari in 
Perry may have come from the conservative Justices on the Court, 
hoping to use it to limit or counterbalance their holding in Windsor.5 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2014, Duke University School of Law; PhD candidate, 2016, Duke Graduate 
Program in Literature. I would like to thank Professors Joseph Blocher and Dana Remus for 
their guidance and support, and the members of DJCLPP, in particular Ravi Patel and Tara 
McGrath, for their insightful comments and careful editing. 
 1.  United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. argued Mar. 27, 2013). 
 2.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. argued Mar. 26, 2013). 
 3.  Adam Liptak, Who Wanted to Take the Case on Gay Marriage? Ask Scalia, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2013, at A1. 
 4.  Most strikingly, federalism considerations bolster opposite positions in the two cases. 
In Windsor, the federalism arguments cut in favor of same-sex marriage: The federal 
government should defer to the states’ inclusion of same-sex couples within the definition of 
marriage because “Congress’s establishment of a competing federal definition of family 
undermines the States’ sovereign authority to define, regulate, and support family 
relationships.” Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor 
at 4, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2013). In Perry, the federalism 
argument cuts against same-sex marriage, characterizing Proposition 8’s exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the definition of marriage as a permissible exercise of state sovereignty in an area 
traditionally reserved for the states. See generally Brief of Thirty-Seven Scholars of Federalism 
and Judicial Restraint as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-
144 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2013) (arguing that the Court should uphold Proposition 8 on federalism 
grounds). 
 5.  See, e.g., Nan Hunter, Why Today’s Argument Could Decide the Gay Marriage Debate, 
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The specific legal issue in Perry is whether California’s revocation 
of the label but not the substantive rights of “marriage” from same-
sex couples violates the Equal Protection Clause or Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The California law is unique in 
two important respects: 1) California is the only state to rescind the 
right of same-sex marriage through constitutional amendment,6 and 2) 
through California’s domestic partnership laws, same-sex couples 
already have access to all the substantive rights of marriage.7 At its 
core, therefore, Perry is about the value of a word and the power of 
government speech to convey normative judgments; simply put, it is a 
case about expressive harm. 
The isolation of the label “marriage” from the substantive benefits 
of marriage makes Perry divisive even among gay rights supporters. 
For instance, the LGBT community is largely united on the issue of 
substantive legal rights, but deeply divided over whether the 
normative goal of state-recognition through a label should be the 
primary political objective, or whether political energy would be 
better spent challenging such normative institutions and addressing 
persistent material inequalities.8 Expressive harm is also theoretically 
divisive. Constitutional scholars disagree about whether expressive 
harm is cognizable as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, or 
whether it is too subjective and open-ended to be recognized as a 
state-imposed harm.9 
 
THE NATION (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/blog/173586/real-argument-today-and-
luck-perry-case-could-go-away (hypothesizing that the conservative Justices supported the grant 
based on an assumption that Justice Kennedy would not want to accept the Respondents’ 
framing); Liptak, supra note 3, at A1 (speculating that the conservative Justices on the Court 
were behind the decision to hear the case out of recognition that their chances of limiting same-
sex marriage would only lessen with time). 
 6.  See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144) (highlighting the 
exceptional nature of California’s withdrawal of the right). 
 7.  Id. at 1069.  
 8.  See Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 236, 244 (2006) (discussing the division within the LGBT community about 
whether state recognition should really be the goal or whether the LGBT community should be 
focusing on the “creative possibilities that the middle ground between criminalization and 
assimilation might have offered up”); see also Lisa Duggan, Beyond Marriage: Democracy, 
Equality, and Kinship for a New Century, S&F ONLINE, ISSUE 10.2 (2012), 
http://sfonline.barnard.edu/a-new-queer-agenda/beyond-marriage-democracy-equality-and-
kinship-for-a-new-century/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (arguing that same-sex marriage has 
become the focal point of the LGBT movement at the expense of other important causes that 
address material inequalities and discussing the conservative legacy of pro-marriage initiatives 
as a form of privatization of responsibility since the Reagan era). 
 9.  While some constitutional law scholars advocate recognition of expressive harm in 
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Despite these internal divisions, expressive harm still offers a 
reasonable grounding for the Court’s holding in Perry. The Court has 
never before held that an expressive harm alone can violate equal 
protection,10 and therefore upholding the lower court’s decision could 
appear as a radical break in jurisprudence. However, when viewed 
through the lens of “animus analysis,”11 affirming the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding and striking down Proposition 8 appears wholly 
commensurate with the Court’s recent jurisprudence. 
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In early 2009, after being denied marriage licenses by the State of 
California, two same-sex couples, Kristin Perry and Sandra Stier, and 
Paul Katami and Jeffrey Zarrillo, teamed up with legal heavyweights 
Theodore Olsen and David Boies to file a suit alleging Proposition 
8—the 2008 California constitutional amendment that had withdrawn 
the right to marry from same-sex couples—violated the Fourteenth 




equal protection, others argue that such an approach makes the Equal Protection Clause too 
open-ended and subjective, and that the Constitution is not intended to protect people’s 
feelings. See Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social 
Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1284 (2011) (characterizing the dominant mode of thinking that 
the only constitutionally cognizable harm is material harm as the “sticks-and-stones” baseline 
assumption). Critics of expressive harm theories cite First Amendment concerns that the 
government must be able to speak freely: “Being incidentally insulted or otherwise harmed by 
government speech . . . might [be] . . . part of the price each of us potentially pays for having an 
effective government, much in the same way that being harmed by private speech is part of the 
price we pay for the First Amendment.” Id. at 1285. And finally, critics of expressive harm 
approaches argue that there is no proof that discriminatory government expression leads to 
actual status harm for the group the government’s expression supposedly stigmatizes: “Stigma is 
not even sufficient, let alone necessary, for status harm.” Matthew D. Adler, Expressive 
Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1436 (2000).  
 10.  See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971) (“[N]o case in this Court has 
held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the 
men who voted for it.”).  
 11.  “Animus analysis” constitutes a distinct line of equal protection jurisprudence—
separate from the tiers of scrutiny framework—that prohibits under rational basis review 
legislation enacted with no legitimate purpose other than a desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group. See infra notes 50–59. For a more complete analysis of this strain of equal 
protection jurisprudence, see generally Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012).   
 12.  Perry, 671 F.3d at 1069. 
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A. The Enactment and Repeal of Proposition 22 
The narrative of Perry, however, begins well before Proposition 
8’s passage. The story begins in March of 2000 when California voters 
passed Proposition 22, which amended the California Family Code to 
limit “valid and recognized” marriages in the state of California to 
those between a man and a woman.13 In response, multiple cases were 
filed in California state courts arguing Proposition 22 violated the 
California Constitution. 
In 2008, these cases were heard collectively as the In re Marriage 
Cases.14 The California Supreme Court struck down Proposition 22 as 
unconstitutional under both the due process clause and the equal 
protection clause of California’s Constitution.15 The court also held 
that the State had to issue marriage licenses without regard to the 
gender of the applicant’s intended spouse.16 In the wake of the 
holding, California counties issued more than 18,000 marriage licenses 
to gay and lesbian couples.17 
B. Proposition 8 
In response to the court’s holding, five residents of California, 
currently Petitioners in Perry, began collecting voter signatures and 
filed petitions to place Proposition 8—an initiative to amend the State 
Constitution to limit recognition of marriage to that between a man 
and a woman—on the November 4, 2008 ballot.18 Following a forty 
million dollar campaign, 52.3% of California voters voted in favor of 
Proposition 8.19 Its passage withdrew from same-sex couples access to 
the legal title of “marriage,” but not to the substantive benefits of 
marriage, which remained in tact through California’s domestic 
partnership laws.20 
In early 2009, after being denied marriage licenses as a result of 
Proposition 8’s passage, Respondents filed suit alleging that 
Proposition 8 violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.21 The district court invalidated Proposition 8 
 
 13.  Id. at 1065 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5). 
 14.  183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 15.  Id. at 451. 
 16.  Id. at 453. 
 17.  Perry, 671 F.3d at 1067.  
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 1069. 
 21.  Id. at 1068. 
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applying strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause,22 but also held 
the law could not withstand even rational basis review under the 
Equal Protection Clause.23 In the face of this decision, the State 
refused to appeal the case to the Ninth Circuit.24 
C. The State’s Refusal and the Proponents’ Intervention 
The five California residents who had led the campaign to get 
Proposition 8 on the ballot petitioned the Ninth Circuit to allow them 
to intervene and appeal the district court decision in light of the 
State’s refusal to defend the measure’s validity.25 The Ninth Circuit 
certified to the California Supreme Court the question of whether, 
under California law, the proponents of Proposition 8 had Article III 
standing either 1) on behalf of their own particularized interest in 
upholding Proposition 8 (third party standing), or 2) on behalf of the 
State’s interest (delegated Article III standing).26 The California 
Supreme Court held that “the official proponents of the initiative 
[were] authorized under California law to appear and assert the 
[S]tate’s interest in the initiative’s validity.”27 In so holding, the 
California Supreme Court declined to address whether proponents 
met the requirements of third party standing under Article III.28 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The issues facing the Court in Perry are standing, the standard of 
review, equal protection and substantive due process. Regarding 
standing, the Court will address whether the proponents of a ballot 
initiative can represent the State’s interests in defending that initiative 
under Article III of the United States Constitution. The other issues—
standard of review, equal protection, and substantive due process—
 
 22.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 706 F. Supp. 921, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry 
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
786 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144)  (holding that no compelling state interest justifies denying 
same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry).  
 23.  Id. (holding there was no rational basis for limiting the designation of “marriage” to 
opposite-sex couples and excluding same-sex couples as a class). 
 24.  Perry, 671 F.3d at 1068. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. at 1074 (asking whether “the official proponents of an initiative measure possess 
either a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or the authority to assert the State’s 
interest in the initiative’s validity”). 
 27.  Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 2011) (emphasis added). This holding only 
addresses the delegation of standing as a matter of state law; this question as a matter of federal 
law remains open.  
 28.  Id. at 1011. 
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overlap. Although the Court has never announced a heightened 
standard of review for statutes that classify individuals based on 
sexual orientation, recent cases addressing their treatment under the 
law appear to apply a heightened form of rational basis review under 
both equal protection and substantive due process analysis.29 The 
equal protection analysis addresses whether gays and lesbians 
constitute a class that by definition warrants the greater protection 
that comes with heightened scrutiny. The substantive due process 
analysis is an alternative basis for heightened scrutiny in this case, 
through Proposition 8’s restriction of either the fundamental right to 
marry or the dignity interest in allowing people to choose their own 
intimate life partner. 
A. The Standing Issue 
As certified by the California Supreme Court, the State’s interest 
in upholding Proposition 8 has been properly delegated to the 
proponents under state law. However, it is unclear whether this 
delegation of authority is sufficient under federal law for Article III 
standing. None of the cases the United States Supreme Court has 
decided regarding delegation of a State’s Article III standing is 
without ambiguity, nor is there a case precisely on point. The two most 
closely related are Karcher v. May30 and Arizonans for Official English 
v. Arizona.31 
Karcher addressed the ability of a State to delegate its Article III 
standing to state representatives. There, two members of the New 
Jersey state legislature intervened at the district court level to defend 
a statute that the Governor refused to defend.32 After the district 
court struck down the statute, but before the case was appealed, both 
members lost their seats in the legislature.33 The Supreme Court 
ultimately affirmed that they had standing in their official capacitites 
to defend the statute on behalf of the State; Justice O’Connor cited no 
textual basis for this decision.34 The Court, however, denied the now 
 
 29.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (holding that moral disapproval 
of sodomy was not a rational basis for the State to discriminate against homosexuals); Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that a state constitutional amendment’s imposition of a 
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single group lacked any rational relation to legitimate 
state interests). 
 30.  484 U.S. 72 (1987). 
 31.  520 U.S. 43 (1997). 
 32.  Karcher, 484 U.S. at 75.  
 33.  Id. at 77–78. 
 34.  Id. at 82. Instead, the Court appears to base its holding on the fact that the New Jersey 
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ex-legislators’ standing to appeal because the capacity for standing 
was retained by the positions held, not by the individuals.35 
In Arizonans for Official English, the Court addressed whether, 
without an explicit delegation of state interest, proponents of an 
initiative had standing to defend it under Article III. The Court 
expressed “grave doubts” that the proponents of a ballot initiative 
would have Article III standing to defend the State’s interest absent 
some express state law granting authority.36 Citing Karcher, the Court 
rejected the ballot proponents’ contention that they had a “quasi-
legislative interest” grounded in the nature of the initiative process.37 
However, because the case was held to be moot on other grounds, the 
Court did not fully resolve the issue of the proponents’ standing.38 
B. Equal Protection and Due Process Claims 
The Court has not clarified the level of scrutiny for statutes that 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.39 One source of 
ambiguity is the degree to which the cases addressing discrimination 
based on sexual orientation blur the line between equal protection 
and substantive due process analysis. Although it appears there is 
some level of heightened scrutiny applied, it is unclear whether such 
heightened review is grounded in equal protection or substantive due 
process analysis. The Court’s application of “animus” analysis in 
Romer v. Evans40 complicates the standard of review question even 
further. 
1. Substantive Due Process and Fundamental Rights 
Under the Due Process Clause, legislation that burdens the 
exercise of a “fundamental right” is subject to strict scrutiny.41 The 
Court has repeatedly recognized marriage as a fundamental right.42 
 
Supreme Court granted the legislators’ petition to intervene. 
 35.  Id. at 81. 
 36.  Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 66. 
 37.  Id. at 44–45. 
 38.  Id. at 66–67. 
 39.  The Court directly addressed the discriminatory treatment of gays and lesbians in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), but neither 
opinion declared a standard of review for laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation.   
 40.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 41.  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).  
 42.  See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“This Court has 
long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of 
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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Loving v. Virginia43 is the most relevant precedent because it 
addresses the ability of a state to exclude couples from the institution 
of marriage.44 
In Loving, a 1967 decision, the Court held that Virginia’s anti-
miscegenation law violated both the Due Process Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 Chief 
Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that there 
could be no justification for the statute other than the maintenance of 
white supremacy.46 Even though marriage had traditionally been 
considered the exclusive province of the States, the Court held that 
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state sources of “invidious 
racial discrimination.”47 
2. Equal Protection: Tiers of Review and “Animus Analysis” 
Equal Protection analysis employs a highly deferential standard 
(rational basis review) unless the law discriminates on the basis of a 
“suspect classification.”48 If a law discriminates on the basis of a 
suspect classification (or against a “suspect class”) it is subject to 
heightened scrutiny.49 The Court, however, has not recognized gays 
and lesbians as a “suspect class.” 
“Animus analysis” comprises a distinct line of equal protection 
cases, outside the traditional tiered framework. This line of cases can 
be traced back to United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,50 
which famously held that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group” could not constitute a legitimate state interest and 
could not withstand even rational basis review.51 In each case, the 
 
 43.  388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
 44.  See id. at 12 (“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry[] a person 
of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 11. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973) (“Under ‘traditional’ equal 
protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained unless it is ‘patently arbitrary’ 
and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.”). 
 49.  See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (legitimacy); Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (race). In Mississippi University for Women v. 
Hogan, the Court held that unlike race, alienage, and legitimacy, which require strict scrutiny, 
classifications based on gender (a quasi-suspect class) need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny. 
See 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (“[A] party seeking to uphold the statute that classifies individuals 
on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive 
justification’ for the classification.” (citation omitted)). 
 50.  413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 51.  Id. at 534. 
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Court struck down a law affecting a politically unpopular (but not 
“suspect” or even “quasi-suspect”) group, such as hippies52 or the 
mentally disabled,53 under rational basis review (not an explicitly 
higher standard). The Court in Romer employed the “animus 
analysis” framework with regard to gays and lesbians. 
In 1992, in response to the passage of several local statutes 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
Colorado amended its state constitution to prohibit such protections.54 
Amendment 2 withdrew from homosexuals, but no other group, legal 
protections prohibiting discrimination.55 In Romer, the Court declared 
the Amendment to be “at once too narrow and too broad[,]” insofar 
as it “identifie[d] persons by a single trait and then denie[d] them 
protection across the board.”56 Because the possible justifications for 
Amendment 2 failed to overcome the “inference of animus” 
established by the deprivation of rights from a politically unpopular 
group, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, concluded that the 
amendment “classifie[d] homosexuals not to further a proper 
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.”57 The 
opinion explicitly affirmed the reasoning in Moreno that “[equal 
protection of the laws] must at the very least mean that a bare . . . 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”58 Eliding a direct statement of the 
standard of review, the Court struck down Amendment 2.59 
Justice Scalia wrote a vigorous dissent in Romer, arguing that the 
majority had “mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite”60 and that it 
was insulting for the Court to “disparag[e] as bigotry adherence to 
traditional attitudes.”61 In addition, he asserted that gays and lesbians 
do not constitute a politically disadvantaged class, but in fact “possess 
 
 52.  See id. (striking down an amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1964 that was intended 
to exclude hippies from the program). 
 53.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (invalidating 
legislation that sought to exclude the mentally disabled from the city through zoning regulations 
as motivated by “irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded”). 
 54.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996). 
 55.  Id. at 627. 
 56.  Id. at 647. 
 57.  Id. at 635.  
 58.  Id. at 634–35 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 59.  Id. The Court avoided a direct statement of the standard of review largely due to the 
conclusion that the bare desire to harm is never a legitimate state interest under “animus 
analysis.”  
 60.  Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 61.  Id. at 652. 
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political power much greater than their numbers.”62 
3. Blurring the Line Between Substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection 
Less than ten years ago, in Lawrence v. Texas,63 the Supreme Court 
overruled a relatively recent precedent when it struck down a Texas 
sodomy law as a violation of the liberty interest inherent in the Due 
Process Clause.64 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, blurred the 
line between equal protection and substantive due process analysis: 
“Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect 
for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are 
linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point 
advances both interests.”65 The Court appeared to employ a form of 
heighted rational basis review. However, neither the standard nor its 
grounding was made explicit. 
The Lawrence opinion ruled out morality as a legitimate ground 
for discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.66 Justice Kennedy 
characterized the liberty to choose one’s intimate partner as a dignity 
interest, stating that the Constitution demands the law respect the 
individual’s autonomy in making these decisions, and that to do 
otherwise “demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”67Although the 
majority in Lawrence declined to rely on the Equal Protection Clause, 
Justice O’Connor embraced it as grounds for striking down the Texas 
statute in her concurrence, arguing that animus analysis should be 
applied.68 
Recent case law thus gives the Court four distinct options for 
applying heightened scrutiny: 1) The Court could view this case as a 
straight violation of the fundamental right to marry (Loving); 2) the 
Court could apply a heightened form of rational basis review under 
equal protection analysis (Romer); 3) the Court could muddle 
 
 62.  Id. at 646. 
 63.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 64.  Id. at 578 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which only seventeen 
years earlier upheld a Georgia sodomy law criminalizing consensual homosexual sex). 
 65.  Id. at 575.  
 66.  Id. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a [s]tate has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the 
practice.” (citation omitted)). 
 67.  Id. at 574–75. 
 68.  Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that when the law exhibits the 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group the Court has used “a more searching form of 
rational basis review” under the Equal Protection Clause).  
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through both equal protection and substantive due process as they 
relate to sexual orientation (Lawrence); or 4) the Court could ground 
its reasoning in “animus analysis,” as the Ninth Circuit did below. 
IV. HOLDING 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that 
Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, but did so on narrower grounds 
than the lower court. The district court held Proposition 8 
unconstitutional under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause.69 The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, considered “the 
narrowest ground for adjudicating the constitutional questions”: 
whether “Proposition 8 singles out same-sex couples for unequal 
treatment by taking away from them alone the right to marry.”70 
Prior to reaching the merits of the case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
Petitioners’ standing. Citing Karcher, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
“[p]rinciples of federalism require that federal courts respect such 
decisions by the states as to who may speak for them,”71 and 
Petitioners’ standing was therefore necessarily a question of state law. 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit abided by the California Supreme 
Court’s decision and recognized Petitioners’ standing.72 
Moving to the merits, the Ninth Circuit considered the case as a 
matter under the Equal Protection Clause. The Ninth Circuit’s equal 
protection analysis was grounded largely in Romer. The court 
rehearsed the similarities between Proposition 8 and Amendment 2: 
1) Both created a carve-out exception in the equal protection clause 
of their respective state constitutions; 2) both singled out one class of 
people for disfavored status; and 3) neither involved stripping a 
constitutionally protected right.73 The court also acknowledged the 
significant difference in the breadth of the two amendments—
 
 69.  Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1076 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144) (noting that the district 
court held Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause for 
depriving same-sex couples of the fundamental right to marry and for excluding only same-sex 
couples from state-sponsored marriage, respectively). 
 70.  Id. The Ninth Circuit’s inquiry was circumscribed by the logic of Romer. In Romer, 
there was no doubt that Colorado did not have to extend anti-discrimination protection to gays 
and lesbians, rather the relevant legal question was whether the subsequent removal of that 
protection could be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 1088 (citing Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)). 
 71.  Id. at 1071. 
 72.  Id. at 1072. 
     73.   Id. at 1081–82. 
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Proposition 8 discriminated with “surgical precision” instead of 
“sweeping effect.”74 The court found that this surgical precision made 
Proposition 8 even more suspect because it made it less likely that its 
passage furthered the State’s interest.75 Like in Romer, because 
Proposition 8 rescinded a right from a politically unpopular group, 
Petitioners had the burden of overcoming an inference of animus. The 
court held that none of the interests purportedly furthered by 
Proposition 8 were rationally related to the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the institution of marriage, and thus Petitioners failed to 
overcome the inference of animus.76 
The court concluded that by stripping same-sex couples of the 
label “marriage,” “Proposition 8 left the incidents [of marriage] but 
took away the status and the dignity.”77 Undergirding this analysis was 
the contention that “[t]he action of changing something suggests a 
more deliberate purpose than does the inaction of leaving it as it is.”78 
Framing the issue in terms of the removal of a right necessarily 
limited the holding to California, because California is the only state 
that has granted and then withdrawn the right to same-sex marriage. 
The court held that “[b]y using their initiative power to target a 
minority group and withdraw a right that it possessed, without a 
legitimate reason for doing so, the People of California violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.”79 The court never reached the broader 
question of whether denial—as opposed to withdrawal—of the right 
to “marriage” violates either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioners’ Arguments 
Petitioners advance six substantive arguments: 1) Petitioners meet 
the requirements for Article III standing; 2) the Court should apply 
rational basis review, not heightened scrutiny; 3) the Ninth Circuit, by 
focusing on the withdrawal of a right, misinterpreted Romer; 4) 
Proposition 8 furthers the State’s interest in responsible procreation; 
5) Proposition 8 is rationally related to the need to proceed with 
 
 74.  Id. at 1081.  
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id. at 1095. 
 77.  Id. at 1079.  
 78.  Id. at 1080. 
 79.  Id. at 1096. 
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caution before creating unforeseen social consequences; and 6) 
upholding Proposition 8 furthers California’s interest in democratic 
self-governance. 
Petitioners begin by affirming their Article III standing to defend 
Proposition 8.80 They argue that, in accordance with both the 
principles of federalism and of precedent, state law should determine 
who is able to assert the State’s interest. They distinguish Arizonans 
for Official English, because here California state law clearly grants 
them standing, as certified by the California Supreme Court.81 
They next argue the standard of review should be rational basis 
review. Although Petitioners claim Proposition 8 could withstand any 
level of scrutiny—even strict scrutiny—they assert that heightened 
scrutiny would be inappropriate. Proposition 8 distinguishes opposite-
sex from same-sex couples because biologically they are differently 
situated with regard to procreation.82 Equal protection only requires 
that the law treat similarly-situated persons alike; it allows the law to 
treat differently-situated people differently.83 Therefore, they argue, 
same-sex couples are treated differently with regards to marriage not 
out of animus but because they are differently-situated with regard to 
the state interest in childrearing.84 
Petitioners refute the logic of the Ninth Circuit opinion as a 
misinterpretation of Romer. They argue the Ninth Circuit’s reading of 
Romer as emphasizing the inability to withdraw a right is 
fundamentally misguided because the Court “struck down 
Amendment 2 on its face,” not based on the few jurisdictions that had 
granted special protections to gays and lesbians prior to its passage.85 
A State is not required to maintain policies that exceed federal 
constitutional requirements.86 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s focus 
on the withdrawal of a right allows an important constitutional 
question to be determined by something as arbitrary as the “timing” 
of Proposition 8’s passage.87 Proposition 8 merely sought to restore the 
traditional definition of marriage, and thus, the Court should not 
 
 80.  Brief of Petitioners at 15–18, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2013).  
 81.  Id. at 17. 
 82.  Id. at 27–31. 
 83.  Id. at 63. 
 84.  Id. (“Providing special recognition to one class of individuals does not demean others 
who are not similarly situated with respect to the central purpose of the recognition.”). 
 85.  Id. at 22. 
 86.  Id. at 19 (citing Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 535 (1982)). 
 87.  Id. 
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privilege the 142 days in which same-sex couples were allowed to 
marry over the long history of the traditional definition.88 
Having challenged the logic of the opinion below, Petitioners 
focus on three state interests furthered by Proposition 8: responsible 
procreation, proceeding with caution, and democratic self-governance. 
Petitioners claim the relationship between marriage and procreation 
undergirds society’s, as well as the Court’s, recognition of marriage as 
a vital institution and a fundamental right.89 They decry the 
transformation of marriage “from a public institution with well-
established, venerable purposes focused on children into a private, 
self-defined relationship focused on adults”90 that would ensue if 
same-sex couples were granted access to “marriage.” Petitioners also 
contend that Proposition 8’s relation to this vital interest is not 
undermined by the fact that under California law, same-sex partners 
are allowed to enter into civil unions and to parent children because it 
is the label of “marriage” imbued with social meaning that functions 
as the incentive.91 They argue reserving the word “marriage” 
exclusively for heterosexual couples is sufficient to further this 
interest: because it “provide[s] special recognition, encouragement, 
and support to those relationships most likely to further society’s vital 
interests in responsible procreation and childrearing.”92 Allowing 
same-sex couples access to the label “marriage” would fundamentally 
change what “marriage” signifies, and this change in social meaning 
would undermine its function as an incentive for couples who 
conceive a child out of wedlock to marry. 
The final two state interests advocated by Petitioners are 
“proceeding with caution,”93 and the California voters’ interest in 
democratic self-governance.94 They argue “proceeding with caution 
before fundamentally redefining a bedrock social institution” is 
necessary to avoid unforeseen social consequences or social backlash. 
Changing the institution of marriage to include same-sex couples 
without broad-based democratic support “could weaken that 
institution, which has traditionally drawn much of its strength not 
 
 88.  Id. at 25. 
 89.  See id. at 31–35 (citing some unlikely sources, from Claude Levi-Strauss to Bertrand 
Russell to bolster this claim).  
 90.  Id. at 53.  
 91.  Id. at 44–48. 
 92.  Id. at 45. 
 93.  Id. at 48–55. 
 94.  Id. at 55–61.  
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from the State, but from social norms derived from and sustained by 
public opinion.”95 
Regarding democratic self-governance, Petitioners’ narrative is 
this: The California voters addressed the issue of gay marriage 
democratically (resulting in the passage of Proposition 22), then the 
court intervened and imposed its views in the In re Marriage Cases; 
the people of California responded through the democratic process to 
this judicial overreach by enacting Proposition 8. The passage of 
Proposition 8 was democracy functioning as a check on the anti-
majoritarian courts. 
B. Respondents’ Arguments 
Respondents96 offer six substantive arguments: 1) Petitioners do 
not have standing; 2) Proposition 8 should be subject to heightened 
scrutiny on two independent grounds: a) under the Due Process 
Clause because it creates unequal access to a fundamental right, and 
b) under the Equal Protection Clause because Proposition 8 
discriminates against gays and lesbians, a “suspect class”; 3) 
Proposition 8 cannot survive even rational basis review; 4) the law is 
not rationally related to the State’s interest in “responsible 
procreation” because heterosexuals who are unwilling or unable to 
procreate are still allowed to marry; 5) “proceeding with caution” and 
the “interest in democratic self-governance” cannot function as 
legitimate state interests under equal protection analysis because they 
do not have limiting principles; and finally, 6) the anti-gay rhetoric of 
the Proposition 8 campaign “leads inexorably” to the conclusion it 
was enacted to make gays and lesbians feel unequal. 
Like Petitioners, Respondents begin by addressing the question of 
standing. They argue that the California Supreme Court’s decision 
that Petitioners had standing on behalf of the State’s interest “does 
not—and cannot—alter Petitioners’ inability to meet the ‘irreducible 
constitutional minimum’ requirement of standing established by 
Article III.”97 Petitioners must have a particularized interest in the 
outcome of the case sufficient for third party standing and the “mere 
 
 95.  Id. at 49–50. 
 96.  I will use ‘Respondents’ to refer to the two same-sex couples who originally brought 
suit.  
 97.  Brief for Respondents at 16, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2013) 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
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desire to defend” is not a sufficient interest.98 
Unlike Petitioners, and unlike the holding in the Ninth Circuit, 
Respondents cast the constitutional issue in very broad terms. 
Respondents argue that Proposition 8 should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny on two independent grounds: 1) because it 
creates unequal access to a fundamental right, and 2) because gays 
and lesbians constitute a minority historically subject to 
discrimination and therefore should be treated as a “suspect class.”99 
Beginning with marriage as a fundamental right, Respondents assert 
that they are not attempting to change the right (or to create a new 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage) but merely want equal 
access to a right the Court has repeatedly recognized as 
fundamental.100 Neither the institution itself, nor the Court’s 
articulation of its value, has ever been limited to persons willing or 
able to procreate; rather, “the decision of whom to marry is at the 
core of individual autonomy and personal liberty.”101 
Respondents next argue that the Equal Protection Clause is 
implicated because Proposition 8 denies gays and lesbians, as a class, a 
right enjoyed by everyone else. Respondents further contend that a 
heightened standard of review is appropriate because gays and 
lesbians constitute a suspect class under the factors established by the 
Court: a history of discrimination, immutability of the defining 
characteristic, relative political powerlessness, and lack of a 
relationship between the characteristic and one’s ability to contribute 
to society.102  
Even if the Court applies rational basis review, Proposition 8 
cannot stand because excluding gays and lesbians from “marriage” is 
not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Respondents argue 
that the establishment of marriage as a legal institution may have 
furthered the Petitioners’ proffered state interest in responsible 
 
 98.  Id. at 13.  
 99.  Respondents highlight a number of government forms of discrimination, including 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the recently repealed government policy prohibiting gays and lesbians 
from serving openly in the military. They also highlight a number of private forms of 
discrimination, including the fact that twenty-nine States still allow employment dismissal or 
denial of housing based on sexual orientation. They assert that like the other suspect 
classifications recognized under equal protection jurisprudence, sexual orientation is an 
immutable characteristic that bears no relationship to one’s ability to contribute to society. Id. at 
28–36. 
 100.  Id. at 14. 
 101.  Id. at 14–15. 
 102.  Id. at 28–29. 
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procreation and childrearing, but that this interest is not advanced by 
the exclusion of gays and lesbians from that institution. Respondents 
also point out that Petitioners do not even argue that prohibiting 
same-sex couples the right to marry will make it more likely that 
opposite-sex couples will marry.103 Furthermore, procreation cannot 
be the primary rationale for marriage because heterosexual couples 
unwilling or unable to procreate are still allowed to marry.104 
Next, Respondents argue that the characterization of “proceeding 
with caution” as a state interest contains a vicious circularity: “[I]f 
[Petitioners] are correct that an unsubstantiated fear of negative 
externalities of equality is sufficient to justify inequality, then 
discrimination is self-justifying.”105 Further, this argument, like the 
interest in democratic self-governance argument, has no limiting 
principle. Taken to their logical conclusions, both of these purported 
interests by definition could be used to eclipse the protections 
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment; yet, “the judiciary’s role 
under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect discrete and insular 
minorities from majoritarian prejudice or indifference, not to yield to 
the majority’s preference.”106 
Finally, the absence of any rational basis combined with the anti-
gay rhetoric used in the campaign “leads inexorably to the 
conclusion” that Proposition 8 was enacted with the sole purpose of 
making homosexuals “unequal to everyone else.”107 To bolster this 
claim, Respondents cite literature from the Proposition 8 campaign 
that cautions against the “danger” that if same-sex marriage is 
permitted, society might come to view homosexual relationships as 




 103.  Id. at 40. 
 104.  Id. at 41. 
 105.  Id. at 47. 
 106.  Id. at 50 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 107.  Id. at 16.  
 108.  Id. at 52. 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
A. Standing in the Way 
The standing question is not an easy one because the Court’s 
precedents on delegation of a State’s Article III standing appear to 
point in opposite directions. 109 Arizonans for Official English appears 
to indicate that without an express grant of authority, safeguarding 
the ballot initiative system is not sufficient grounding for standing. 
However, the Court’s holding in Karcher suggests a textual basis is 
not always required for delegation of  State’s Article III standing.110 
As much as supporters of gay marriage would like to see the 
Court reach the merits, the standing issues are not insignificant.111 In 
Perry, if the Justices were looking for a reason to find a standing 
problem, they would not have to look far. The California Supreme 
Court’s holding that California law allows for proponents of 
initiatives to represent the State’s interest was not grounded in the 
text of a statute or any provision of the California State 
Constitution.112 The holding was based instead on a history of 
initiative proponents’ participation in state court litigation on behalf 
of the State’s interests and a functionalist argument about 
“safeguard[ing] the unique elements and integrity of the initiative 
process.”113 Dicta in Arizonans for Official English casts at least some 
doubt on whether the Court will accept the functionalist rationale 
underlying the California Supreme Court’s conclusion because the 
Court expressed “grave doubts” about proponents standing absent an 
express delegation of the State’s interest.114 Petitioners are private 
 
 109.  For a full discussion of the standing precedents in Perry, see generally Marty 
Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s Article III Questions in the Same-Sex Marriage 
Cases (VI), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Understanding Standing VI], 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understanding-standing-the-courts-article-iii-questions-in-
the-same-sex-marriage-cases-vi/. 
 110.  See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987) (concluding the two legislators had standing 
under New Jersey state law to intervene, despite citing no textual basis for this conclusion).  
 111.  See generally Marty Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s Article III 
Questions in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases (I), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 17, 2013) [hereinafter 
Understanding Standing I], http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understanding-standing-the-
courts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-cases-i/ (noting that the Court has been 
“unusually attuned to some fundamental and vexing issues of Article III standing”). 
 112.  Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1073 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144) (citing Perry v. Brown, 52 
Cal. 4th 1116, 1151–52 (Cal. 2011)).  
 113.  Id.  
 114.  See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66 (1997) (refusing to 
resolve whether a plaintiff that cannot show express delegation would have standing). 
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individuals, not elected, and thus are not subject to the democratic 
checks or ethical standards of public officials; there is no indication 
why or in what manner Petitioners could be said to be agents of The 
People of California.115 Furthermore, Petitioners’ original petition for 
intervention did not seek to intervene on behalf of the State’s interest, 
but instead on behalf of their personal and particularized interests.116 
Although neither of these standing issues is insurmountable, what 
seems like a mere hurdle in getting to the merits may appear more 
consequential down the road.117 
If the Court were to hold that the Petitioners lack standing, the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision would also be vacated. The district court’s 
holding, however, would be preserved and give rise to a subsequent 
controversy over whether the district court judge, in issuing an 
injunction that extended beyond the two couples, exceeded his 
remedial power.118 It is unclear, however, who could appeal the scope 
of the injunction.119 
If a majority of the Justices want to hear the case, however, the 
Court will likely find standing despite these issues. In recent years, the 
Court has tried to ensure that important cases are heard.120 
Furthermore, the initiative process argument, even if functionalist in 
nature, is highly logical. The initiative process creates laws that the 
legislature is not allowed to repeal or amend; denying proponents the 
right to defend the laws passed through this process would allow the 
executive and legislative branches to achieve what they could not do 
directly (repeal the statute) through the courts (by refusing to defend 
its validity). In addition, there was not an explicit textual basis in 
 
 115.  Brief of Att’y Gen. of Cal. Kamala D. Harris as Amicus Curiae at 10–12, Perry v. 
Brown, No.10-16696 (May 2, 2011). See also Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 65 
(expressing in dicta concerns that the proponents of an initiative are neither elected 
representatives nor agents of the people). 
 116.  Understanding Standing VI, supra note 109.  
 117.  See id. (discussing the potential problems if initiative proponents are allowed to 
represent the State’s interest, including: proponents’ lack of accountability or concern for how 
the litigation might impact the state financially or might impact other laws, the possibility of 
division among the proponents about whether to appeal, and lack of political accountability). 
 118.  Marty Lederman, The Court’s Five Options in the California Marriage Case, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 1, 2013,), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/the-courts-five-options-in- 
the-california-marriage-case/. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See Understanding Standing I, supra note 111 (discussing the Court’s recent standing 
decision in Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) as “[possibly reflecting] a willingness on 
the part of at least some Justices to temper their usually strict Article III jurisprudence to ensure 
that the Court itself has an opportunity to weigh in on certain important constitutional 
questions”).  
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Karcher for allowing the intervention by state legislators on the 
State’s behalf, and yet the Court found that New Jersey law gave them 
standing. And finally, at least as formulated below, the form of Article 
III standing at issue is in reference to representation of the State’s 
interest and therefore deference to the state supreme court is 
warranted. Thus, despite these inconsistencies, due to the salience of 
the case combined with the logic of Petitioners’ argument regarding 
the preservation of California’s popular referendum, the Court will 
likely find standing. 
B. Standard of Review 
If recent jurisprudence is any indication, considering that Justice 
Kennedy is likely to write the opinion, it seems unlikely that the 
Court will announce a higher standard of review, even if it employs a 
heightened form of rational basis review.121 In both Romer and 
Lawrence, although apparently employing a form of heightened 
rational basis review, Justice Kennedy declined to articulate a new 
standard.122 
Part of the reason the Court has never explicitly announced a 
heightened standard may be that gays and lesbians do not fit neatly 
within the equal protection “suspect class” criteria.123 For instance, 
although there is clearly a history of discrimination, questions remain 
whether they are a politically powerless class.124 It was precisely this 
 
 121.  See Jeffrey Toobin, The Court’s Gay-Marriage Confusion, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 
27, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/03/supreme-court-prop-8-
toobin-kennedy.html (commenting that “as usual, it’s probably all up to Justice Anthony 
Kennedy,” the well-known swing vote on the Court). Toobin’s assumption, echoed by many, 
that the outcome and the opinion will be in the hands of Justice Kennedy, is based on the idea 
that the four liberal Justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) will all find Proposition 
8 unconstitutional, whereas the four conservative Justices (Scalia, Roberts, Alito, Thomas) will 
find it to be within California’s police power. 
 122.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the 
majority opinion as “apply[ing] an unheard-of form of rational-basis review”); Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (stating that Amendment 2 defies traditional judicial review). 
 123.  This debate has evolved. Originally, it was based in a distinction between action and 
identity (and framed as a debate about whether sexual orientation could be considered under 
equal protection or whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was only 
cognizable under the Due Process Clause). However, the Court in recent years has declined to 
recognize this distinction between conduct and identity as applied to gays and lesbians. See 
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010) (stating explicitly that the Court 
does not recognize this distinction); Romer, 517 U.S at 633 (moving away from conduct-based 
distinctions, and recognizing gays and lesbians as a cognizable class of citizens).  
 124.  “Footnote Four” famously grounded the need for a heightened standard of review in 
the inability of certain insular minorities to take advantage of traditional political channels. It 
reads: “[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which 
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issue of political powerlessness that Justice Scalia took up in his 
Romer dissent, calling it “nothing short of preposterous” to label gays 
and lesbians a politically unpopular class because they enjoy 
“enormous influence in American media and politics.”125 The recent 
and rapidly evolving support for same-sex marriage, as well as the 
Obama administration’s historic intervention on Respondents’ behalf, 
lends at least some credence to Scalia’s argument.126 Perhaps 
anticipating this interpretation of the Administration’s intervention, 
the Solicitor General’s brief directly addresses this argument against 
granting heightened scrutiny,127 arguing that despite recent political 
progress, gays and lesbians still constitute a disfavored minority 
subject to unjustified targeting in the democratic process.128 
The Court is even more unlikely to apply heightened scrutiny 
based on Proposition 8’s implication of the fundamental right to 
marriage because such a holding would possibly indicate a fifty-state 
solution; it would overturn laws in more than forty states, which, as 
discussed below, would violate the principle of judicial minimalism 
and trigger concerns about the legitimacy of the Court.129 That said, 
the Court’s refusal to articulate a new standard of review does not 
mean the Court will exercise the highest degree of deference in its 




tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon 
to protect minorities.” United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See 
generally Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 
YALE L.J. 1287 (1982).  
 125.  Romer, 517 U.S at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In this discussion, Scalia cites as evidence 
of homosexuals’ political power that despite composing only 4% of the Colorado electorate, 
they managed to “get” 47% percent of the electorate to vote against Amendment 2.  
 126.  For a comprehensive discussion of the poll numbers and this perceived political shift, 
see generally Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage is Changing, and What It Means, 
NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013) http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-
opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-is-changing-and-what-it-means/. 
 127.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (Feb. 28, 2013).  
 128.  Id. at 9. 
 129.  Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (highlighting two “cardinal 
rules” of the federal courts: “never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of 
the necessity of deciding it,” and “never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is 
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied” (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. 
Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))). 
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C. Narrow Holding 
If the Court reaches the merits, it seems unlikely the Court will 
overturn the Ninth Circuit’s narrow holding.130 It appears equally 
unlikely, however, that the Court will offer a complete endorsement 
or a national imposition of same-sex marriage. Instead, the Court will 
reach a decision that implicates only California or one that affects 
California and the other seven states that have granted civil unions 
with full substantive rights to gays and lesbians. Either holding would 
circumscribe the harm as denial of the access to the label “marriage.” 
Even under rational basis review, the Court is unlikely to be 
swayed by interests offered by Petitioners. Petitioners’ central 
argument that the primary purpose of marriage is to promote 
responsible procreation and childrearing is contrary to the Court’s 
articulation of marriage as a fundamental right. At the same time, the 
Court will be more sympathetic to the other two interests, 
“proceeding with caution “and “respect for the democratic process.” 
However, these principles should not stand as legitimate state 
interests under rational basis review because equal protection comes 
into play precisely when legislation has been democratically passed 
yet discriminates against an insular minority. Therefore, overturning 
discriminatory legislation is always both anti-majoritarian and 
disruptive of the status quo. 
The image of marriage that Petitioners argue is in the State’s 
interest to preserve runs contrary to the Court’s depiction of marriage 
as a fundamental right and as a sacred bond between adults. 
Petitioners decry the transformation of marriage “from a public 
institution with well-established, venerable purposes focused on 
children into a private, self-defined relationship focused on adults” 
that would result from recognizing same-sex marriage.131 This 
approach is misguided because “a private, self-defined relationship 
focused on adults” is wholly commensurate with the Court’s recent 
opinions on marriage. Loving characterized the institution of 
marriage as “a deeply public and private symbol that carries profound 
consequences touching on individual self-understanding and social 
mores.”132 In other cases, the Court has described marriage as a 
 
 130.  Ironically, even Justice Scalia, in his vehement dissent in Lawrence, acknowledged that 
the majority’s logic would jeopardize laws banning same-sex marriage. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 588, 600 (2003). 
 131.  Brief of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 53. 
 132.  Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional Inevitability of Same-Sex 
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privacy right,133 a right of association,134 and a liberty right “of 
fundamental importance to all individuals.”135 These articulations cast 
marriage as part of defining one’s own identity rather than simply 
serving the purpose of childrearing. In particular, Justice Kennedy, 
again the one likely to be writing for the Court,136 has articulated the 
choice of one’s partner as part of the way individuals constitute their 
identity.137 The Court therefore is unlikely to endorse a view of 
marriage as necessarily, or even primarily, related to childrearing. 
Furthermore, Petitioners’ assert the primacy of the childrearing 
aspect of marriage without addressing the obvious critique that 
heterosexual couples who are incapable of procreating (and therefore 
not furthering this interest) are allowed to marry. 
Unswayed by the procreation argument, the Court will likely be 
more sympathetic to Petitioners’ “proceeding with caution” and 
“democratic process” arguments. Although not cognizable as 
rationally-related state interests,138 Petitioners’ final two arguments 
will influence the Court’s decision and will limit the expansiveness of 
its holding. In light of federalist and institutional concerns, the Court 
will not hold denial of same-sex marriage to violate equal protection 
more generally. The likely outcome is either an affirmation of the 
Ninth Circuit’s logic grounded in Romer139 or the eight-state solution. 
Either holding could appeal to those concerned about the Court’s 
legitimacy and matters of institutional competency, and serve as an 
intermediate stepping stone toward inevitable marriage equality. The 
Ninth’s Circuit’s holding would be limited to California. The eight-
 
Marriage, 71 MD. L. REV. 471, 488.  
 133.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (describing marital privacy as “a 
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights, older than our political parties, older than our 
school system . . . and intimate to the degree of being sacred”). 
 134.  M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (“Choices about marriage, family life, and 
the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as of basic 
importance in our society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State’s 
unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 135.  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (emphasis added). 
 136.  See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 137.  In Lawrence, Kennedy wrote that “our laws and tradition afford constitutional 
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage . . . [and] family relationships” because of 
“the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these 
choices.” Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at 22 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
574 (2003)). 
 138.  Although these arguments draw on judicial concerns the Court weighs when 
considering constitutional rights claims, they cannot be considered under the rational basis test 
because neither has a limiting principle.  
 139.  See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.  
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state solution would hold that those states that already grant all the 
substantive rights of marriage to gays and lesbians through civil 
unions cannot constitutionally withhold the label “marriage” from 
those unions.140 At oral argument, the Justices seemed wary of the 
Solicitor General’s advocacy of the eight-state solution and skeptical 
that its reasoning had such cognizable limits.141 
D. Expressive Harm 
Perry is, at its core, a case about the power of government speech 
to convey normative judgments. Expressive harm refers to the 
negative social meaning or inferior status a law attaches to a 
particular group. On expressive harm grounds, the Court would be 
justified in holding that Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has never held that 
expressive harm alone can violate equal protection; therefore holding 
as such could be characterized as a radical break with past 
jurisprudence. At the same time, such a holding would be completely 
commensurate with the Court’s “animus analysis” and would not 
actually represent a departure from past jurisprudence. 
1. Perry is a Case About Social Meaning and Expressive Harm 
Approaches to law that focus on the meaning conveyed or 
produced by the State’s actions are termed “expressive theories of 
law.”142 Expressive theories of law begin with the baseline assertion 
that a State’s actions convey meaning and express a point of view. The 
meaning a given law expresses is not solely determined by the 
intentions of those who enacted it, but also by how it fits within the 
landscape of norms and practices more generally (and is therefore 
 
 140.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 127, at 33 (“California’s extension of all of 
the substantive rights and responsibilities of marriage to gay and lesbian domestic partners 
particularly undermines the justifications for Proposition 8.”). 
 141.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. 
argued Mar. 26, 2013) (Kennedy, J.) (questioning the rationale of essentially “penalizing” 
California and those state that “ha[d] been more generous, more open to protecting same-sex 
couples”). Justice Alito also expressed incredulity that the eight-state solution was based on 
legally cognizable distinction: “[A]re you seriously arguing that . . . if the case before us now 
were from a State that doesn’t provide any of those benefits to same-sex couples, this case 
would come out differently?” Id. at 43. Even the liberal justices expressed reservations about 
the eight-state solution. For instance, Justice Sotomayor highlighted its logical inconsistency, 
remarking, “there is an irony in [the eight-state solution], which is the States that do more have 
less rights.” Id. at 54–55. 
 142.  Adler, supra note 9, at 1364. 
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defined by its “social meaning”).143 Accordingly, the State has an 
obligation to ensure that its actions express equal respect and concern 
for all of its citizens.144 State actions that fail to do so, even without 
material consequences or malicious intent, are legally cognizable as 
state-imposed harms, known as “expressive harms.”145 In essence, 
expressive harms are state actions that confer second-class status onto 
a particular group.146 
At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts framed the issue as the 
struggle over the meaning of a word: 
[I]f you tell a child that somebody has to be their friend, I suppose 
you can force the child to say, this is my friend, but it changes the 
definition of what it means to be a friend. And that’s it seems [sic] 
to me what the . . . supporters of Proposition 8 are saying here. . . . 
[A]ll you’re interested in is the label and you insist on changing the 
definition of the label.147 
In fact, both Petitioners and Respondents in Perry agree that this 
case is about the government’s role in producing the social meaning 
of this “label,” and both argue their case in expressive terms. The 
difference is that Respondents do not believe that granting same-sex 
couples access to the label “marriage” would diminish its value or 
status, just as the meaning of “marriage” did not change when 
interracial couples were granted the right to marry.148 In contrast, 
Petitioners, like the Chief Justice, think that the struggle is over 
preserving the current meaning of the word, which would necessarily 
change if same-sex “marriage” were recognized.149 Nonetheless, the 
 
 143.  Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1525 (“These meanings are a result of the ways in which 
actions fit with . . . other meaningful norms and practices in the community. Although these 
meanings do not actually have to be recognized by the community, they have to be recognizable 
by it, if people were to exercise enough interpretive self-scrutiny.”).  
 144.  Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 
2 (2000). 
 145.  Id.  
 146.  See generally Jeffrey S. Helmreich, Putting Down: Expressive Subordination and Equal 
Protection, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 112 (2012). An expressive approach to equal protection is 
not equivalent to, and should not be conflated with, the “colorblind” approach. Both the 
colorblind and the anti-caste approaches to equal protection incorporate expressive elements. 
The difference between the two approaches hinges on which categorizations convey second-
class citizenship. See Hellman, supra note 144, at 16–17. 
 147.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 44–45.   
 148.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at 26. 
 149.  Petitioners explicitly recognize the State’s role in the production of social meaning, 
arguing that “it matters what California or the United States calls marriage, because this affects 
how Californians or Americans come to think of marriage.” Brief of Petitioners, supra note 80, 
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battleground on which this case is being waged from all sides is 
undeniably an expressive one.150 
Respondents argue that withholding the label of “marriage” 
constitutes a state-imposed harm.151 Civil unions function as “badge[s] 
of inferiority, separateness, and inequality,”152 even though they have 
the same substantive rights as marriage, they argue, because denial of 
the label “marriage” is a declaration “[w]ith the full authority of the 
State behind it” that gays and lesbians are not good enough to 
marry.153 
The strongest argument in favor of a cognizable harm in Perry is 
one that proceeds by analogy and has been made by many 
commentators on the issue.154 The analogy goes as follows: Imagine in 
the wake of Loving, Virginia immediately passed a law granting 
interracial couples all of the substantive rights and obligations of 
marriage but terming their civil arrangement something else, such as 
“interracial union.” If it were true that denying same-sex couples 
access to the label “marriage” does not convey second-class 
citizenship and constitute a state-imposed harm, it would have to also 
be true that the denial of the label to interracial couples would not 
constitute a state-imposed harm.155 When placed in this context, it is 
hard to contend that denial of the label “marriage” conveys anything 




at 50–51 (quoting ROBERT P. GEORGE ET AL., WHAT IS MARRIAGE?: MAN AND WOMAN: A 
DEFENSE 54 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 150.  In addition to the parties’ arguments and the Justices’ questions, the Solicitor 
General’s brief also foregrounds the expressive stakes of the issue in Perry by advocating the 
“eight-state solution,” which focuses on the isolation of the term from the substantive rights of 
marriage (that is what distinguishes the eight states from the others). 
 151.  Brief of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 53–54 (“[W]ithholding it causes infinite and 
permanent stigma, pain, and isolation. It denies gay men and lesbians their identity and their 
dignity; it labels their families as second-rate.”). 
 152.  Id. at 54. 
 153.  Id. at 28. 
 154.  See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 9, at 1272; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Ninth Circuit’s Perry 
Decision and the Constitutional Politics of Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 96 
(Feb. 22, 2012); Tribe & Matz, supra note 132, at 486. David Boies also made this analogy at 
oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 45. 
 155.  Dorf, supra note 9, at 1272.  
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2. Is Expressive Harm Alone Enough to Constitute an Equal 
Protection Violation? 
The first question is whether expressive harm is sufficient to 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Palmer v. Thompson156 appears to 
indicate that purely expressive harm is not enough. In Palmer, the 
closing of a community pool in the face of an order to desegregate, 
despite its clear discriminatory intent and message, was “an 
unsuccessful attempt to violate the Constitution.”157 This holding seems 
relatively damning to Respondent’s case because it indicates that 
isolated expressive harm is not legally cognizable as state-imposed 
harm. 
However, as Michael Dorf rightly points out, the analogy between 
Palmer and the same-sex marriage context is not a neat one, and it in 
fact may be misleading.158 The proper analogy between Perry and 
Palmer would be if the state of California, in the wake of the In re 
Marriage Cases, had ended “marriage” as an institution, making it 
unavailable to both heterosexual and same-sex couples.159 Palmer 
holds that even open animosity is not enough if the law affects all 
members with at least formal equality,160 but its holding does not 
preclude expressive harm from being sufficient when, like in Perry, it 
is coupled with facially discriminatory treatment of a vulnerable 
group. 
3. How to Measure Expressive Harm: Intention or Impact? 
Even if one concedes expressive harm could be sufficient to 
trigger Fourteenth Amendment protections, the question of how to 
measure expressive harm remains. The two mechanisms by which 
expressive harm could be measured, both with long histories in equal 
protection analysis, are “intention”161 and “impact.”162 In general, equal 
 
 156.  403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 157.  Dorf, supra note 9, at 1273 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private 
and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crimes and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23).  
 158.  Id. at 1274.  
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224–25 (holding that closing the swimming pool to avoid 
desegregation did not formally treat blacks differently from whites, and that “no case in this 
Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the 
motivations of the men who voted for it”).  
 161.  The intent-based approach to equal protection asserts that discriminatory intent 
should be the primary measure for invalidating laws under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Hellman, supra note 145, at 1–2. 
 162.  The impact-based approach to equal protection asserts that discriminatory effects, 
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protection analysis tends to privilege discriminatory intent over 
disparate impact.163 
The Court’s formulation of “animus,” however, seems to constitute 
a third approach,164 which borrows elements from both “intent” and 
“impact” and yet is more commensurate with expressive harm or 
social meaning analysis. Animus analysis adopts intention analysis’s 
focus on the content of the message as opposed to its material 
consequences. However, animus analysis adopts impact analysis’s 
objective approach rather than a subjective approach. For example, in 
Romer, the Court in finding animus did not conclude that the 
Colorado voters had hatred in their hearts; instead, it found that from 
an objective perspective, the amendment lacked any relation to a 
state interest and could only be understood to establish gays and 
lesbians as unequal to everyone else.165 Animus analysis appears to 
embody a move to a more objective approach to meaning, and thus 
one closer to social meaning. The analysis therefore becomes not 
about whether the voters harbored ill will or hostility, but whether the 
message conveyed could be understood as conveying second-class 
citizenship. This leads inevitably to the question of whether depriving 
the label of “marriage” is connotative of second-class citizenship. The 
analogy to Loving certainly seems to provide the basis for such a 
conclusion. 
By either affirming the Ninth Circuit’s logic or electing the eight-
state solution, the Court would in essence hold that a merely 
expressive harm violates the guarantee of equal protection. Although 
this would be in some ways a narrow holding (applying to only one or 
eight states, respectively), it would not be a conservative one. Many 
have argued that recognition of expressive harm is implicit in 
jurisprudence of the formalist and functionalist members of the Court 
alike,166 but expressive harm has never been isolated in an equal 
protection case the way it is in Perry. A holding based on expressive 
 
oftentimes referred to as “disparate impact,” should be the primary measure for invalidating 
laws under the Equal Protection Clause. Id.  
 163.  See id. (discussing the dominance of the intent-based approach to equal protection 
analysis and its historical ascendancy in the wake of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976), 
the case in which the Court first articulated that disparate impact was not sufficient to establish 
a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause).  
 164.  See supra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
 165.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
 166.  Dorf, supra note 9, at 1286 (arguing that there is “a cross-ideological consensus that 
social meaning alone can be the basis for limiting government speech and action when the social 
meaning expressed is second-class citizenship”). 
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harm would be both completely in line with the Court’s articulation of 
animus analysis and a somewhat radical step forward in the Court’s 
recognition of the importance of social meaning.167 
Although the Court will adjudicate Perry in terms of the right to 
the word “marriage,” its pairing with Windsor168 may in fact make the 
expressive harm reasoning more palatable to the Court insofar as it 
illustrates the degree to which the expressive and material are never 
wholly separate in the law. Windsor could impact the stakes of Perry 
ex post by changing the significance of state recognition. If the Court 
strikes down DOMA, holding that the government has to allocate 
federal marriage benefits to all couples legally married under their 
state’s laws, then how California defines “marriage” will determine 
whether same-sex couples in California have access to federal 
marriage benefits. Depending on how Windsor comes out, access to 
the word “marriage” could be the deciding line between receiving and 
not receiving federal marriage benefits—reminding the Court that 
government speech always has consequences. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the current political climate, it is hard to believe that the Court 
held the criminalization of homosexual conduct unconstitutional less 
than ten years ago. And the pace of progress on this issue is only 
accelerating. Within one year of President Obama’s first public 
acknowledgement of narrowly circumscribed support, he offered a 
full-throated endorsement of marriage equality in his Inauguration 
Speech.169 Republicans who campaigned against same-sex marriage in 
the last election less than a year ago joined the administration among 
the amici curiae in support of Respondents. Despite this rapid 
evolution—or perhaps because of it—the Court is likely to either 
 
 167.  It would admittedly be ironic that disparate impact could only be cognizable under 
strict scrutiny but expressive harm could violate even (heightened) rational basis. However, it is 
very hard to imagine that expressive harm when paired with material harm would be any easier 
to justify under equal protection analysis. 
 168.  United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. argued Mar. 27, 2013) (addressing whether 
the Defense of Marriage Act’s denial of federal marriage benefits to same-sex couples legally 
married under the laws of their state violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
protection). 
 169.  “Our journey is not complete until our gay brothers and sisters are treated like anyone 
else under the law, for if we are truly created equal, then surely the love we commit to one 
another must be equal, as well.” President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-
barack-obama.  
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avoid the issue or offer a narrow holding in Perry. At this rate of 
political progress, however, playing it too safe could leave the Justices 
on the wrong side of history more quickly than they expect. 
 
